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With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia being its legitimate heir lost most of its greatness. 
In recent years, coincided as they have been with Vladimir Putin holding office, Russia appears to have 
been on the way to recover and reemerge as a first tier great power in world politics. Holding constant 
the shaping influence of the international system and geopolitics, this development also owes much to 
the legacy of Czarism, the Soviet Union and Putin’s two-term presidency. 
 





The post-Soviet era may be divided into two periods: one of Boris Yeltsin and another of 
Vladimir Putin and his recently elected successor Dmitri Medvedev embracing the 1990s and 
the first decade of the twentieth first century respectively.1
Specifically, following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, Russia ceased being not only 
one of the world’s two superpowers but also the major leading power in Europe and Asia. In 
terms of hard and soft power of all kinds, it inherited a little more than one third of the Soviet 
Union’s whole. Geopolitically in particular, Moscow lost: 
 These two periods have been 
featured as the fall and rise of Moscow. During the first period, the main trait was the fall of 
Moscow’s power and prestige as the center of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, as 
well as its quasi-eclipse from international affairs. In the second period, we have been 
witnessing the rise of Moscow as the glorious capital of Russia and as an increasingly 
important global player. 
 
- the countries of the Soviet Union’s spheres of influence all over the world, in 
particular those in central and eastern Europe. This, as a sequel to this event and 
natural as it was, went hand in hand with the closure of its military bases abroad, 
                                                          
* Tassos E. Fakiolas: Special Advisor on Russian and East European affairs for a Greek business firm, 
Athens, Greece. Efstathios T. Fakiolas: Strategy and Southeast European Affairs Analyst, ATEbank, 
Athens, Greece. 
1 Although Putin left his presidential post in mid-May 2008, his period might be claimed not to have 
been over. That is so because immediately after Medvedevf was inaugurated president, he appointed 
Putin prime minister. Hence, Putin remains in charge on the centre stage. However, as this event had 
taken place several months before research for this article was completed, we hereby focus only on 
the legacy of Putin as president. That time, too, coincided with the fierce outburst of the present 
global financial crisis and, thereby, we assume that its effects on the global economic balances are 
bound to affect all the great powers of our era pro rata. For example, when the crisis erupted, Russia 
was number four in the world by its trade and current account balance surplus. For the first quarter of 
2009, on the other hand, its economy is estimated to have contracted by 9.5%, while for the entire 
year this figure is forecast to reach 7.0%. 
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the degeneration of its armed command and control systems, and the disarray of its 
fighting services; 
- all the republics but Russia that made up the former Soviet Union;2
- Crimea and part of the southern Siberia, which during the Soviet era were given to 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan for administrative reasons. 
 
 
To these key geopolitical losses was added the economic plight. Throughout the Cold 
War, Moscow stood economically second to the United States of America (US). After the 
end of the Cold War, it was no longer among the capitals of the world’s ten most powerful 
countries. Whether or not the Soviet system was economically ineffective (Fakiolas 1985a: 
39-52), the heart of the matter was that in 1992 the financial deficit “was downright 
disastrous”: 30 to -35 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This was related, by and 
large, to the massive outpouring of cash into the economy through central bank credits “that 
had no backing whatsoever” (Dubinin 1995: 51). By then there were no funds to pay for the 
import of food and medication, service foreign loans and reimburse tickets for ambassadors 
to travel abroad or return from their embassies to Moscow (Gaidar 2006: 377-390). Poverty 
was rampant even among nuclear-weapon guards; it was no secret that many of them were 
forced to go on hunger strikes because they had been without pay and allowances or 
homeless. In a sense, Russia’s transition to democracy and market economy was a 
catastrophe. Military decay, political vice and corruption, economic hardship, societal unrest, 
and deterioration of morals staged an acute comeback. 
During the course of the Yeltsin period, indeed, Russia suffered an uninterrupted seven-
year fall of production.3 In the space of one decade (1989-1998), its GDP fell sharply by 44 
percent, while its industrial production and investments twofold and fivefold respectively 
(Kydrov 2004: 338, 513). For instance, the aerospace industry, which in the Soviet age 
accounted for a quarter of the world’s aircraft output, went into deep recession as orders 
dried up. In just three years (1990-1993), Russian exports reduced from $ 208 billion to $ 60 
billion and imports from $ 197 billion to $ 44 billion (The World Bank 1994: 5). The result 
was that foreign trade revenue climbed down from ten percent of the net material product to 
2.3 percent (The World Bank 1995: 427). At that time doing business in Russia took “ten 
times longer than anywhere else” (Andresen 1995: 39). That public health care and insurance 
were remarkably downgraded was also hardly surprising. As a result, alcoholism, drug abuse, 
tuberculosis, hepatitis B and C rage, Aids, and other diseases aggravated. 4
Overall, in 1998 Russia was nearly bankrupt. It was forced to default on a $ 40 billion 
domestic debt and devalue the ruble. Two years later, its GDP was estimated at 64 against 
100 in 1990 (Khasbulatov 2006: 669-70). Its share of world GDP (2.1 percent), industrial 
 And life 
expectancy at birth for men worsened. Between 1985 and 1990 it stood at 64.9 years, 1990 
and 1995 at 60.8 years, and 1995 and 2000 at 60.2 years (Gaidar 2003: 39). 
                                                          
2 The demise of the Soviet Union was not followed by the break-up of Russia. Chechnya, the most 
insurgent area in the country, proved unable to secede, notwithstanding that it enlisted to its cause the 
support not only of many Arab states but also of much of international media (Fayutkin 2006: 52-5). 
3 According to Russian figures, only the mining industry production remained unimpaired, and its share 
in the Russian GDP increased from 18.1 percent in 1990 to 24.4 percent in 2000. Also, in 1996 the Russian 
raw materials reserves were estimated to worth about $ 28.6 billion. The percentage share of natural 
gas in this sum amounted to 32.2, coal 23.3 and oil 15.7 (Goricheva 2004: 53). 
4 “The death of a nation,” Time, 22 January 2001, 29. 




production (4.4 percent) and commodity exports (1.0 percent) was much lower than it was in 
1990 and far lower than that of the US (21.2 percent, 21.9 percent, 11.8 percent) and China 
(10.7 percent, 11.1 percent, 7.7 percent) respectively (Obolensky 2004: 72, 74, 81). In 
essence, Yeltsin’s Russia saw its human and material resources shriveled up, its finances on 
the verge of collapse and much of its population living in abject poverty. Thereby, it endured 
a sharp and severe lessening of its greatness. 
By contrast, the Putin period is marked with recovery. The trends of decline reversed and 
Russia began to regain much of the ground it had lost. As the first decade of the twentieth 
first century draws to a close, Moscow is by far in better situation both domestically and 
internationally than it was in the 1990s. Since the advent of Putin to power, growth rates 
have averaged 7 percent, it being higher that the world average of 5 percent and two to -three 
times higher than those in the US and Europe. In 2005, the Russian GDP amounted to $ 763 
billion. However, in purchasing power parity terms this figure was estimated at $ 1.56 trillion 
in 2005 and $1.67 trillion in 2006 (IISS 2007: 195). Official statistics is argued to have 
undervalued private consumption spending, insofar as the share of shadow economy is about 
45-50 percent of GDP. Thus, estimates for GDP should be revised by 40-45 percent upward 
to reflect it to its full extent (Gotz 2005: 242). 
In 2002, the European Union (EU) accorded to Russia the status of market economy. This 
made it easier for Moscow to contest anti-dumping practices, benefit from lower tariffs and 
reduce its debt burden. Alongside went achievements like a budget surplus, a soaring stock 
market and inflated central bank reserves; and reforms such as the introduction of a new land 
code and a flat tax for personal income which has set the stage for a considerable amount of 
Russian capital abroad to repatriate. Russia today is more investor-friendly thanks to its 
political stability, healthy finances, abundant raw materials and energy resources, cheap and 
skilled workforce, and sufficient transport facilities. It is no coincidence that in 2007 more 
than six million work permits were issued for migrants from the poor ex-Soviet republics. 
These people are added to eight to twelve millions that the Russian federal migration service 
estimates that currently are working illegally in the country. In terms of global migration, 
Russia is the main destination for immigrants, surpassed only by the US. That is due partly to 
ethnic Russians returning to the motherland, but also to Georgians, Moldavians and other 
citizens of the ex-Soviet republics “moving to Russia in search of work”.5
In short, Russia re-surges out of the ashes of the profound depression of the 1990s to log 
nearly a decade of outstanding growth and development. This domestic rejuvenation has 
played its part, along with the concurrent balancing imperatives thrown in by the US’s 
unilateralist assertive actions, in laying the foundations for the Russian political leadership to 
embark on staking a claim for a leading role in world politics. Moscow has consistently 
spelled out that it is determined to reassert its right to have a say in international affairs on 
account not merely of its geographical position in the center of Eurasia, its nuclear arsenal, 
its highly competitive competence in space exploration and utilization and its permanent 
membership of the UN’s Security Council. Also, it aspires to restore its power status on the 
world stage by fully mastering its domestic potential and possibilities from the huge wealth 
of natural resources, the pool of skilled scientists and the military technology expertise to the 
use of economic and foreign policy tools. 
  
It is from this so-often neglected angle that the article seeks to shed light on the domestic 
sources of Russia’s resurgence as a global great power. It argues that in addition to the 
                                                          
5 The Economist, 20 January 2007, 33-4. 
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pushes of the international system and geopolitics, this development owes much to the 
legacy of Czarism, the Soviet Union and Putin’s two-term presidency. Thus, the article 
proceeds with exploring the main assets, that is territory size and mineral resources, with 
which Czarism endowed today’s Russia. Next, it discusses the legacy of the Soviet Union 
and Vladimir Putin, and closes with conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE CZARIST LEGACY 
 
To begin with territory size, Russia today is smaller than the Soviet Union, nearly by one 
fourth.6
Also, Russia has no equal in terms of mineral resources. In fact, it is the world’s sole 
energy superpower, having abundant energy resources nearly of all sorts. It is number one in 
natural gas reserves amounting to 32 percent of the world’s total. These reserves may sustain 
Russia’s prevalence both as global producer and exporter until the end of the current century 
(Polyakov 2005: 110-11). To this should be added the fact that Moscow is first in the listing 
of timber reserves and second of coal reserves (30 percent of the world’s total). Its share of 
world oil reserves is estimated at 17-18 percent, of world palladium at 50 percent, of world 
nickel at 40 percent, of world iron ores at 30 percent and of world uranium at more than 10 
percent (Encyclopedia 2005: 44; Mazin 2006: 4). 
 Following the end of the Cold War, it lost not only most of the Soviet Union’s 
territorial gains but also a considerable slice of the Czarist legacy including Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, it still remains the world’s biggest country, being 
about 1.7-1.8 times the size of Canada, China and the US, two times the size of Brazil, and 
four times the size of the EU. And it possesses 31.5 percent of Eurasia’s territory, roughly 23 
percent of which lies in the eastern part of Europe. 
What is more, if Russian proven oil and gas reserves are combined, Moscow occupies the 
first place in world ranking, with about 15 percent more reserves than Saudi Arabia’s (Eyal 
2002: 24). Siberia and Far East have reserves that “Russia can rely on its prosperity in 21st 
century.” Historically, European Russia spent huge resources for Asian Russia. This is no 
longer the case and is not likely to be in the years to come, inasmuch as “eastern Russian 
energy resources are the basis for the country’s future development” (Bagaturov 2004: 98). 
There is no denying that “energy reserves in eastern Russia […] far exceed those in the entire 
Caspian Basin,” since eastern Russia is estimated to have as much as 278 billion barrels 
compared to the 233 billion barrels of the Caspian basin (Goldstein and Kozyrev 2006: 163, 
176). 
According to the statistics of Table 1: 
 
- energy exports, which fell substantially in the years 1990-2000 (from 706 to 526 
million tons of conditional fuel), are expected to climb up to about 530-600 million 
tons of conditional fuel in 2010-2020. Like in the past,7
                                                          
6 Russia as a territorial entity surpasses more than threefold all the other fourteen republics of the 
former Soviet Union taken together (17,1 million sq km against 5,3 million sq km). 
 Russia in the near future 
will continue producing and exporting energy resources of all sorts, something that 
no other country in the world is able to do;, 
7 Early in the 1980s, for instance, 62 percent of all Russian exports were natural resources-based, of 
which the share of fuels amounted to less that 53 percent (Fakiolas 1985b: 376). 




- the share of Commonwealth of Independent States, which in 1990 was more than 
half the total 
of Russian energy exports, fell sharply and came down to amount to less than 20 
percent in 2000. By contrast, the countries of the Far Abroad increased their share 
in Russian energy exports fourfold to more than 80 percent. This trend is most 
likely to endure until 2020;, 
- of all energy resources, oil and coal exports today are and will be lower than the 
level of the 1990s. On the contrary, the level of natural gas exports will be much 




Table 1. Export of Energy Resources from Russia (ml) 
  1990 2000 2010* 2020* 
Total to the world (t.c.f.) 706 526 530-600 565-585 
of which     
Oil and oil products (t.) 286 143 155-180 150-165 
Natural gas (c.m.) 213 193 245-275 275-280 
Coal (t.c.f.) 30 28 15-20 18-20 
Electricity (kwh) 37 13 30-35 40-75 
     
Total to the CIS Countries (t.c.f.) 372 102 105-125 110-125 
of which     
Oil and oil products (t.) 154 16 20-25 25 
Natural gas (c.m.) 101 59 70-80 65-70 
     
Total to the Far Abroad (t.c.f.) 334 424 440-475 455-460 
of which     
Oil and oil products (t.) 132 127 135-155 125-140 
Natural gas (c.m.) 112 136 175-195 210-220 
*: forecasts 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
ml.: million 
t.: tons 
t.c.f.: tons of conditional fuel 
c.m.: cubic meters 
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The overwhelming majority of Russia’s energy resources, therefore, are related with 
hydrocarbons. The potential for energy saving however is enormous. That is why in 2003 the 
Russian government set the more effective exploitation of these resources as a strategic 
priority. They decided that nearly three four of the additional resources that were to go to the 
market should spring from the reduction of waste in energy (Kovtunov and Titov 2004: 66). 
On this count, indeed, Russia remains one of the foremost culprits in the world. Hot water 
from central water supply facilities is pumped into the consumer network mostly through 
non-insulated pipes, while “thermostatically controlled heating remains virtually unknown in 
Russian homes” (European Parliament Directorate General for Research 1993: 46). And in the 
Siberian oil fields billion of cubic meters of gas are most often burnt off unused. 
Despite these shortcomings, Russia is the only country in the world that may supply the 
EU and China with ample energy resources, including electricity, in the coming decades. 
More important still, Russia being a Eurasian country and having common frontiers with the 
EU and China can transfer most of those resources by the cheapest way, through pipelines 
and grids. 
Having insufficient energy resources, the EU and China appear intent on increasing 
energy resources imports from Russia. Moscow is ready to supply fuels in preferential prices 
and establish a longstanding energy partnership with Brussels in return for EU investments in 
the Russian energy sector. From this angle, the interdependence of markets, geographical 
proximity, and the existence of traditional economic ties and developed pipelines 
infrastructure are said to be the conditions that are required for the built-up of an effective 
common Russia-Europe energy space (Telegina 2003: 60). Not accidentally, with the 
progressive connection of energy networks and systems between Europe and Asia, the volume 
of the Russian electricity set to be exported to the EU, the CIS and China is expected to 
enhance considerably (Grinkevich 2003: 15-24). 
To close this section, a measure of the key weight of the Czarist legacy is the fact that up 
to end-2008 Russian economic recovery and modernization was being driven mainly by 
rising energy prices. With the oil peaking $ 147 per barrel, Russia was then the world’s 
number three, after China and Japan, in gold and foreign exchange reserves, having totaled a 




3. THE SOVIET LEGACY 
 
Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union a well educated and experienced 
manpower. However, over the Cold War the Soviets bought up to twelve times more 
technology than they were able to sell.8 This was so despite the fact that they had about 
5,500 research centers and labs employing 1.1 million people. Two decades ago, the 
percentage participation of scientists and engineers in national labour was estimated at 11.6 in 
the Soviet Union and 6.3 in East Germany against 11.5 in Japan and 5.3 in West Germany. 
At the time, not accidentally, the Economist commented: “how educated a workforce” the 
Soviets had; if only they could “dash for greater freedom in politics and markets at home.”9
                                                          
8 “Soviet Union making effort to export technology to West,” International Herald Tribune, 16 August 
1977. 
 
9 The Economist, 30 May 1987, 72. 




In the post-Soviet period, despite the low public funding of centers of Research and 
Development (R & D), the Russians continue to have excellent and internationally 
competitive human resources in numerous scientific fields, including aerospace, earth 
sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics and nuclear applications. However, early in the 
2000s, although Russia’s share of the world research employment was 11 percent, its share 
of the world research expenses was just one percent.10
Last but not least, Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union a strong tradition in 
space, nuclear and military manufacturing. Industries in those fields are largely state-owned, 
but being capable of producing their own high technology they can potentially foster 
Russia’s capabilities and reach as a global economic player. In particular, the world share of 
Russian enterprises in the construction of atomic electric stations and commercial space 
launches is estimated at 11 percent, while in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at 8 to 9 
percent (Obolensky 2003: 9-10). The output of these sectors is exported to Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and Europe. China, India and Iran are the principal markets for Russian 
conventional weapons, nuclear reactors, and space equipment and services. China, for 
instance, has long been the biggest buyer of Russian arms. It has made considerable purchases 
of advanced weaponry mainly for its navy and air force. These purchases include destroyers, 
submarines, sea-skimming, fighter jets and anti-ship missiles.
 Indeed, while the share of R & D in 
the Russian GDP showed signs of slight upturn scaling up from 0.9 in 1996 to 1.16 in 2001, 
Moscow kept spending for R & D 9.3 times less money than Japan, 4.7 than Germany and 
2.8 than France (Obolensky 2003: 9-10). 
11
As for the Europeans, so long as the construction order for numerous Airbus A400 is 
expected to be ready for delivery not earlier than 2009, they have leased the Russian military 
cargo aircraft Antonov 124-100, which until 2003 successfully flew to more than 600 airports 
in 137 countries carrying heavy engines, oil and gas pumping units, satellites aircraft and 
helicopters.
 Beijing is also said to pursue 
buying Russian nuclear technology. 
12
In 2005, Russian weaponry exports amounted to $ 6.1 billion. In 2007, too, Moscow 
gained a $ 7.5 billion deal to supply Algeria with fighter aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft 
missiles.
 Of the contracts Moscow has signed with Greece, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Lithuania for the purchase of weapons, the longest term one is set to be carried out in 
2015. Additionally, Russia and the EU are about to begin consultations over the conditions 
with which the former is likely to provide the member-states of the latter with nuclear fuel 
supplies (Sumarokov and Sumarokov 2006). Moscow’s atomic energy designs involve, 
among others, the goal of turning the country into the world’s largest repository of spent 
nuclear fuel with industries to reprocess it. 
13
                                                          
10 2002, Russia’s science in numbers, Moscow, 94, 104, 128; (Obolensky 2004: 72, 74). 
 At the same time, having arranged joint investments in uranium projects with 
countries such as Venezuela, Sudan and Kazakhstan, the Russians let it be known that they 
would look for a similar agreement with South Africa (IISS 2007: 194; Anderson 2007: 70). 
And now we will turn to examine which were, in our opinion, the most important in-house 
moves Putin’s administration went through that had their own share, along with the Czarist 
and the Soviet legacy, in setting the domestic stage for the re-emergence of Russia as a key 
strategic actor in the international scene. 
11 “Coming over the horizon. Why China wants a bigger navy”, The Economist, 6 January 2007, 44. 
12 2003, “Strategic airlift on call,” World Defence Systems 6 (August): 24. 
13 The Economist, 10 February 2007. 
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4. VLADIMIR PUTIN’S LEGACY 
 
It goes without saying that it was Yeltsin and his close fellows that engineered the rise of 
Putin to power. But the critical dimension of the rise was that while initially Putin had been 
appointed prime-minister by the Kremlin establishment and with the consent of the Duma, 
afterwards he was elected president with a clear popular mandate. This, coupled with his 
strength of character and grasp of personal capabilities, enabled him from the outset to 
pursue freedom of moves and autonomy of ruling. Putin could thus be said to have gone 
through three grand strategic steps shortly after he took office. 
 
4.1. State authority restoration 
 
Putin’s first grand step, after he succeeded Yeltsin, was to restore the authority of the 
president as the primary source of state power in Russian politics and render it the one and 
only guarantor of the political order. His ultimate aim, in that regard, was to foster the 
fundamentals of the political system, marked as they were by the strong presidential powers. 
He did so, in the first place, by making a clean sweep of Yeltsin’s political associates and 
wider entourage. Hence he renewed the governing coalition with political personnel and 
senior state functionaries loyal to his cause. 
In the second place, Putin reinstated and demarcated the bounds of constitutional power 
among the executive, the legislative and the judiciary; although in the course of his 
administration the former branch of power was made to overshadow the two latter 
branches. 14
The Putin leadership showed ample signs of firm determination to get businessmen to 
bend to the interests of the state. He reframed the power competition for the spoils of office 
by setting new rules of the game. Entrepreneurs were called on to stay out of politics, pay 
their taxes, conform to the law and avoid bribing public servants. So long as did they respect 
and play by the rules, the Kremlin abstained from investigating economic crimes they had 
allegedly committed during the sweeping privatizations of the Yeltsin period.
 To this was added the fact that he rallied around the task of breaking the 
notorious and corrupt relations between business and state (Sakwa 2008: 185-91). Of the 
business elite, he targeted those few tycoons, the so-called oligarchs, who during the Yeltsin 
period not only created a huge fortune by acquiring on the cheap the most profitable assets of 
the Soviet public productive means but also capitalized fully on their financial might to 
manipulate the government, thereby commanding both politics and economics. 
15
                                                          
14 One effect of this development is claimed to have made Putin the dominant player in Russian politics to the 
extent that political power “is being intimately connected to personalities rather than institutions.” The other effect 
is that Russia tends towards “becoming a unitary state than a federation,” while at the same time “elections are 
manipulated and controlled by the Kremlin and fundamental human rights and liberties are violated” 
(Pallin 2008: 26). 
 Indeed, the 
majority of Russia’s business community displayed willing and strong attitudes of 
cooperation and adaptation to the new situation. Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman and 
Oleg Deripaska, among many other key figures of the oligarchs, were cases in point. Not 
15 It is indicative that in the 1990s, according to Sergei Stepashin, the head of the Russian parliament’s audit 
committee and prime minister during the Yeltsin presidency, Russia was estimated to have made a ‘laughable’ 
$ 9.5 billion out of the privatization of 140,000 state companies. Financial Times, 14 May 2004, 12. 




only did they realise that Putin’s policy was in tune with popular feeling. More important 
still, they well understood that in a country where personal success and property was much 
conditioned on a measure of fidelity pledging to central authority,  they had no choice but to 
submit loyalty to Putin’s rule. 
The oligarchs who instead refused to toe the line and insisted on getting engaged in 
politics drew themselves into the vortex of the Kremlin’s exasperation. Some of them, like 
Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, having been accused of corruption and fraud, 
were forced to flee abroad. Others were arrested and imprisoned on charges of large-scale tax 
evasion. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the Yukos oil company, suffered a humiliation 
of this kind, which eventually came to symbolise both the high stakes involved and the 
culmination of Putin’s campaign against the noncompliant top tycoons. Whether or not the 
2003 Yukos affair was actually a palpable demonstration of totalitarianism, or an acute 
violation of property rights by the state, the gist of the matter was that it “signalled the 
Kremlin’s determination to assert its authority over the business community” (Sakwa 2008: 
187). As a result, the aftermath of this fierce struggle found the Putin leadership stronger and 
more capable of defining the preserve of presidency and mustering the allegiance of big 
business to state institutions. 
Overall, Putin was capable of rearranging the domestic power game but without turning 
the ruling regime upside down. By standing, at least apparently, by the letter of the 
constitution, he fabricated a new start of the play in a way that evolved to his political 
benefit; in the notion that it set the stage for him to buttress the power prerogatives of 
Russia’s presidential system, and thus to centralize and improve the state’s decision-making-
and-implementation capacity. The more Putin’s moves on this count gathered momentum, 
the more his popularity was heightened and so did the Russian business elite line up to reach 
and forge a consensus with him. In fact, oligarchs who abstained from politics and stack to 
the value of corporate social responsibility had no reason to oppose Putin, inasmuch as their 
business activity remained intact and social order was secured. Putin’s new rules of the 
domestic game aimed not so much at re-establishing the Russian economic life under state 
ownership as at restoring the presumed sway of politics over economics. It is no coincidence 
that a considerable section of the Russian society perceived of the prosecution of the few 
oligarchs “as advancing a political and economic system, where many people …. could enjoy 
property and political access” (Caranghan 2007: 64). From this standpoint, the widely held 
fear that the capture and the nationalization of Khodozkovsky’s company would inescapably 
led to the liquidation of the business community and the demise of democracy and market 
economy in Russia was far from reality. 
 
4.2. Market Reforms 
 
In essence, the anti-oligarch campaign paved the way if not purposely intended for the 
further advance of market reforms but this time under state control, the second grand 
domestic step that Putin took after his ascent to power. Notwithstanding the outcry the Yukos 
affair incited in the West, multinational companies kept looking for investment opportunities 
or doing business in Russia as usual. In reality, there existed “a striking dissonance between 
the growing Russophobia of politicians and the enthusiasm of investors.”16
                                                          
16 “Business in Russia. Dancing with the bear,” The Economist, 12 February 2007, 59. 
 Not accidentally, 
in 2006 foreign direct investments amounted to $ 42 billion. 
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It was shared understanding, though scarcely spoken out, among the Western political 
and economic elites that Putin’s Russia bore no resemblance to the Soviet Union. The 
Russian people enjoyed numerous freedoms, “to travel, open businesses, go to church, watch 
satellite television or use an uncensored internet-unthinkable 20 years ago.”17 The days of 
command economy were over definitely. Compared to Yeltsin’s liberal restructuring of the 
Russian economy however, the Putin administration might be said to have pursued a policy 
of state-driven but market-oriented economic modernization. As one analyst puts it, he set out 
a “neocorporatist state-sponsored model of economic development,” in order to create and 
transform state holding companies into “national champions” in such key sectors as energy, 
arms and aircraft manufacturing (Sakwa 2008: 187-90). This was a matter of strategic 
consideration rather than an issue about renationalizing a sizeable segment of the economy. 
In December 2005, for instance, the director of the federal security service proclaimed that 
there were “suspicions that foreign capital could have been at the roots of attempts to force 
defense companies into bankruptcy.” Some time later, a bill was introduced to exclude 
foreign investments from 39 sectors including aerospace and defense. In 2007, foreign 
capital was not allowed to acquire a controlling stake in about 550 Russian companies 
(Anderson 2007: 71-2). The private forces of capitalism, therefore, were left free to work in 
conditions of competition in areas where the state was not intent on doing business or 
controlling resources and rents in the name of national interest.18
At the same time, as the Russian companies and in particular the state-controlled 
champions outgrew opportunities at home, they began to venture abroad by obtaining a 
notable or a majority equity participation in enterprises located in the former Soviet republics, 
Europe and Africa. In terms of geography, in that regard, Russia is faired well since it has 
extensive ground and maritime frontiers with the world’s biggest markets, the EU, China, 
Japan and the US. Clearly, the more Russian companies play by international market rules 
with a view to a global customer base, the greater are the prospects for them to comfortably 
compete and become global-scale companies. 
 
 
4.3. Foreign policy re-orientation 
 
Putin’s final grand step concerned foreign policy. Unlike Yeltsin who swung from 
appeasement to confrontation with the West, Putin tried to assert Russia’s first-tier greatness 
through joining and actively engaging with the international community but doing so in its 
own way. In view of the US’s unilateral assertiveness (Fakiolas and Fakiolas 2007: 53-86), 
he devised a policy intended to “combine adaptation to international norms with a reversed 
area of autonomy and scope for indigenous development” (Sakwa 2008: 244). In addition to 
countering US Pax Americana moves, this policy could be said to have had two major 
objectives. One was to integrate Russia into the world economy. Apart from assisting 
Russian companies to invest and put through deals abroad especially in the sectors of raw 
resources and arms, effort was devoted to inaugurating Russia as member of the World Trade 
Organization.19
                                                          
17 “The pull of power: How nothing is left to chance in Putin’s ‘managed democracy’,” Financial Times, 
27 June 2006, 13. 
 Yet by the time Putin stepped down from the presidency, while the task of 
18 Nonetheless, inside the country Putin was criticised for setting the private aside, “not relying on the 
private sector any more,” Izvestia, 12 August 2005, 5 (in Russian). 
19 We distance from the conventional belief that Putin’s Russia seeks to become an energy superpower. 




penetrating the world energy and weaponry markets met with much success, the issue of 
membership remained open due primarily to the US’s opposition. 
The second objective was to foster solid relations with the EU and China. As regards the 
former, the Kremlin was reported to believe that Russia would never become “part of the 
European family,” and it was destined to evolve into “an independent centre of power-same 
as China, India, Japan, the EU and the US.” 20 But almost two years ago, Putin had no 
hesitation to declare that “Russia is a member of the European family in spirit, history and 
culture…when I consider the future of our relations I do not see any areas that are not open 
to equal, strategic cooperation based on common objectives and values” (Putin 2006: 10). 
This was meant to imply that, as several Russian scholars argue, even though Russia did not 
aspire to join the EU and sought to retain its freedom of action, its security, political and 
economic future lay with Europe.21
The Russia-EU relationship, though not free of friction and setback, made noteworthy 
progress during the course of Putin’s two-term presidency. Dated back to 1997 when the 
partnership and co-operation agreement (PCA) entered into force, relations were upgraded 
with an energy dialogue launched by the October 2000 Russia-EU summit. The dialogue was 
set to explore whether the two partners could construct common oil and gas pipelines and 
interconnect their electricity grids.
 
22
Overall, Putin’s decision to orient Russian foreign policy towards Europe seems to be 
paying off. Cooperation is increasingly expanding from trade and energy through the fight 
against organized crime and corruption to space, having “enormous potential.”
 In 2003, at the St. Petersburg summit, Moscow and 
Brussels decided, on the basis of the PCA, to establish common spaces in four areas: 
economics, freedom, security and justice, external security, and education and culture. Two 
years later, the Moscow summit adopted road maps that detailed the way these spaces would 
come into being (Council of the European Union 2005: 2-3). And it was not until Putin left 
office as president and took over as prime minister that late in May 2008 Russia and the EU 
agreed upon starting negotiations over the renewal of the PCA. However, today these talks 
appear to have dragged on as a result of Poland’s strong opposition. 
23 Of course, 
the degree to which Russia and the EU are prepared to develop a strategic partnership is 
conditioned largely by the manner they are to deal with the outstanding issues of energy 
security and geopolitical flux in their joint near neighbourhood.24 All other things being equal, 
integration process is bound to gather speed in the medium term. The main driving force 
behind is the fact that while the EU accounts for roughly 50 percent of Russian exports and is 
the largest provider of economic and technical aid to Russia, the latter can potentially serve as 
the Union’s principal energy supplier and market for exports and investments. 
With respect to China, Russia tried to capitalize on the friendly relations that the two 
countries, each one with a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, developed 
                                                          
We subscribe to the view espoused by The Economist that rather than being an end in itself, “in today’s 
Russia, energy is itself the tool of influence,” in its “A bear at the throat,” 14 April 2007, 27. 
20 “Russia-self-confident state re-enters world stage,” Financial Times, 21 April 2006, 2. 
21  (Vinokurov 2006: 51); (Skorov 2005: 79-84); (Yudanov 2005: 53-5); (Pavlov 2004: 57-69); 
(Sckolyar 2004: 36-9); (Inozemtsev 2002: 13); (Tsivarev 2002: 18-29). 
22 Russia’s natural gas is forecast to account for about 50 percent of EU gas imports by 2030. See The 
Economist, 14 June 2008, 67. 
23 “Stronger Russia-EU links urged,” Financial Times, 23 May 2006, 2. 
24 (Massari 2007: 8-13); Financial Times, 18 April 2008, 3. 
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during NATO’s air campaign in the Balkans in 1999. Shortly after he came to power, Putin 
took the initiative of settling nearly all his open disputes with Beijing, including that over 
their borderline which was the cause of their armed conflict at the end of the 1960s. The 
Russia-China relationship was further built up on their common fear of the US’s unilateral 
assertiveness. Not only were they disturbed by the American criticism of their domestic 
human rights record. Also, they were alarmed by the US’s meddling in Chechnya and 
Taiwan and its intense military presence nearby their frontiers. 
In this context, Russia and China sealed their determination to concert their moves in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization in order to direct the future of Central Asia. It was no 
coincidence that in 2005, for the first time they jointly staged a war game that looked like a 
rehearsal of invading Taiwan. 25
To come full circle, a last word must be said about the domestic constraints that are likely 
to weaken the potential of rising Russia. One major problem facing today’s Russia is that its 
economy rests heavily on extracting sector rather than machinery and high-tech 
manufacturing. In the mid-2000s, the share of oil, gas, raw resources, metals and timber in 
Russian exports was roughly 75 percent, whereas that of machines and tools nine percent and 
high-tech products 1.5-1.8 percent (Polyakov 2006: 89). Putin seemed fully aware not only 
of this weakness but also of the potential involved. Addressing the Russian business 
community he stated that his goal was first to “maximize the profit from every ton of iron 
ore…and other raw materials” and then use the proceeds to renovate and diversify the 
economy; he felt confident that this was the necessary precondition “for developing 
manufacturing industry, and to miss such opportunities is impermissible.”
 At the same time, Beijing concluded, in addition to the 
purchase of weapon systems and equipment, a deal to build a 5,000 km high-voltage grid to 
get electricity from Russia. The latter, in return, appeared to have promised to construct one 
oil and two gas pipelines. On the whole, Putin made great strides in coming to terms with 
China, a fact that along with his other domestic steps enabled Russia to stand up for itself 
more vigorously than it did in the past. A caution should be entered, however. So long as the 
US unilateral proclivities are in force and Russia’s natural resources can feed China’s 
industrial growth, the prospect for further development of the political and economic 
relations between the two countries is very promising. This by no means implies that the 
conditions for a strategic partnership are mature. The struggle for power and security in the 
energy arena in the wider Eurasian region is everyday in the agenda of world politics (Hall 
and Grant 2009: 113-37). This should be added to the fact that Beijing does not seek to 
challenge the other great power of our era; while Moscow being the next most formidable 
nuclear power after the US has no incentive to strategically ally with the Chinese, the third in 
rank nuclear power in the world. 
26
The other key limitation concerns the outdated state of Russia’s Soviet-era infrastructure, 
as the recent disastrous accident in its biggest hydroelectric power station has vividly 
demonstrated. Politicians and senior state functionaries recognise that many years and 
enormous funds are needed for Moscow to renovate obsolete industrial plants, 
communications and road and rail networks. It is no coincidence that long before the 
accident, the Russian government pronounced its intention to budget $ 1 trillion in the next 
  
                                                          
25 “When dragons dance with bears. Russia and China are getting along better than ever-for now,” The 
Economist, 2 December 2006, 61. 
26 “Putin urges business chiefs to modernise,” Financial Times, 7 February 2007, 2. 




ten years in order to renew the country’s crumbling infrastructure.27
 
 Even today, amid the 
global economic recession that affects vitally its growth and development prospects, the 
Russian leadership is ready to spend billions of rubbles to this end and, thus, pave the way for 





Late in the 1990s one could hardly place a bet in the comeback of Russia as a first tier 
great power in world politics within the span of a president’s two terms of office. But Putin’s 
Russia won the bet. Instead of standing on the edge of power collapse, as it so often did in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia today is a preeminent global actor. A month before he 
left his presidential post, Putin had declared that his administration resulted in the 
“resurrection for Russia, with a strong independent state and a strong foreign posture”.28
This re-emergence, we reason in this article, was enabled by domestic forces related to 
the legacy of Czarism, the Soviet Union and of Putin’s presidency besides the systemic 
impact of the US’s unilateralism. Czarism and the Soviet Union endowed Russia with an 
array of considerable assets: strategic location at the heart of Eurasia, rich energy resources 
and an excellence in space, earth sciences and nuclear applications, coupled with high-
technology military-industrial research tradition and development potential. In turn, the eight 
years of Putin’s rule laid the ground for Russia to restore the status of its state machinery and 
demarcate the power prerogatives in all realms of domestic politics; accelerate market reforms 
and its integration into the world economy; and to come to terms with the EU and China. All 
these domestic forces played their shaping part in pushing the Putin leadership to reassert 
Russia’s great power aspirations and play for high stakes in world politics. 
 At 
the time, Putin’s ambition to get Russia becoming “an equal in the society of the most 
developed states” appeared to have been rewarding, even though his regular forceful assertive 
moves “threatened the existing balance of relationships and increasingly provoked zero-sum 
confrontations” (Sakwa 2008: 298-99). If nothing else, the August 2008 Russian limited war 
in Georgia, a few months after Putin stepped down from the presidency and re-took office as 
prime minister, confirmed Moscow’s firm determination to safeguard its first violin role in 
its Near Abroad and insist on its status as a resurgent global great power (Shearman and 
Sussex 2009: 251-75; Allison 2008: 1145-171). 
For the time being, and despite the repercussions of the global economic recession, the 
tendency for reassertion remains markedly discernible in the Kremlin’s strategic designs and 
moves. But this should not be mistaken for a revival of renewed, Soviet-style expansionism. 
Russia scarcely has a present and a future as “a global superpower,” however, as a matter of 
fact “it is once again a force in world affairs”.29
                                                          
27 “Medvedev inherits a tricky legacy,” Financial Times, 18 April 2008. 
 What it seeks is to be recognized by the US 
and the EU as an equal strategic partner in collective global leadership. Two years ago, 
Russia’s minister for foreign affairs was truly apocalyptic of his intentions in declaring that 
“we favour an integrated approach to solving the problems of the Euro-Atlantic region-in a 
trilateral format” (Lavrov 2007: 13). This stance, of course, is dictated by its power 
28 As quoted in “From Russia with love?”, The Economist, 4 April 2008. 
29 “The Editor’s Column,” Financial Times, 2 January 2007. 
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deficiencies, primarily of economic nature. 
Even though Putin, to come full circle, has since May 2008 handed over presidency to 
Medvedev, he stays on power as prime minister to manage his legacy and complete the 
course he set out over the past eight years. As head of state, Medvedev is expected to leave 
behind its indelible mark on Russia’s economic and social transformation in a more 
modernistic and democratic direction (Antonenko 2008: 25-31). He pledged, at his 
inauguration speech, to “be further developing civil and economic freedoms, creating new 
and broadest opportunities for the self-fulfilment of citizens.”31 This, certainly, remains to be 
seen. Yet no matter who will really steer the country and who will be reduced to merely run 
the everyday state affairs, the heart of the matter is that both Medvedev and Putin are firmly 
committed to the task of Russia attaining the top rank in the form of a leading great power on 
the world stage. 
“Medvedev vows to preside over wider freedoms,” Financial Times, 8 May 2008, 2. 
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